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Holography, the three-dimensional imaging technology, was portrayed widely as a para-
digm of progress during its decade of explosive expansion 1964–73, and during its subse-
quent consolidation for commercial and artistic uses up to the mid 1980s. An unusually
seductive and prolific subject, holography successively spawned scientific insights, putative
applications and new constituencies of practitioners and consumers. Waves of forecasts,
associated with different sponsors and user communities, cast holography as a field on the
verge of success—but with the dimensions of success repeatedly refashioned. This retarget-
ing of the subject represented a degree of cynical marketeering, but was underpinned by
implicit confidence in philosophical positivism and faith in technological progressivism.
Each of its communities defined success in terms of expansion, and anticipated continual
progressive increase. This paper discusses the contrasting definitions of progress in hologra-
phy, and how they were fashioned in changing contexts. Focusing equally on reputed ‘fail-
ures’ of some aspects of the subject, it explores the varied attributes by which success and
failure were linked with progress by different technical communities. This important case
illuminates the peculiar post-World War II environment that melded the military,
commercial and popular engagement with scientific and technological subjects, and the
competing criteria by which they assessed the products of science.
Keywords: Holography; Hologram; Progress; Expansion; Success; Failure; Forecasting; 
Dennis Gabor; Conductron; Kip Siegel; Artists; Artisans; Embossing; Stephen Benton; MIT 
Media Lab
Introduction
Practitioners are often the principal narrators of the evolution of a young technical
subject, and the first judges of its significance and potential. Within such communities
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of technologists and scientists, while the validity of technological progressivism has
been eroded over recent decades, it has continued to inform judgments of success.
Historians of science and technology can inadvertently sustain such viewpoints by
omission, overlooking subjects that do not demonstrate commonly recognized indica-
tors of achievement.1 Such criteria are usually taken to include the intellectual, cultural
and economic impact of new sciences and technologies. Other, sociological, indicators
may include the emergence of a disciplinary presence in academic curricula; a profes-
sional identity; and, the growth of occupations related to the new subject. Yet the
absence of some of these characteristics excludes a wide range of subjects in science and
technology from consideration, and indeed some historians and sociologists argue that
such fields represent a distinct class.2 These unstable subjects resist recent sociological
explanations of consensus. They may not, for example, show convincing closure of
technical and intellectual debates.3
Further attention is needed to clarify how interest groups can differently assess
‘success’ and ‘failure,’ and thereby influence the fate of technologies and their subse-
quent historical evaluation, but a more sensitive approach than studying these two
alternate end-points is to study attributions of progress. During the evolution and
lifetime of a technology, outright success and failure are seldom judged; instead,
practitioners and adopters evaluate progress so as to apply corrective measures, make
decisions about adoption or revise forecasts. Only in retrospect does the subject acquire
the totalizing label ‘success’ or ‘failure.’ By observing how progress is evaluated group
by group and case by case, we can gain a clearer understanding of their effects on the
technological trajectory and ultimate judgment of a subject, and how they relate to
historians’ own assessments. Such analysis may reveal the overgeneralizations and
unbalanced perspectives that can promote faith in technological determinism.
A study of this kind is perhaps easiest for a young subject that has attracted several
technical constituencies and for which consensus has been elusive. Such a subject is
holography, the science of three-dimensional imaging based on optical interference.
From its conception in 1947, the field has repeatedly mutated and successively enrolled
new communities of practitioners, sponsors and consumers. While in some respects a
typical post-World War II technical subject, holography has been unusually wide-
ranging in the applications and social groups that it embraced. The subject found
relatively stable niches as a scientific specialty and technical solution, but has attracted
ambivalent assessments of progress. Holography has been both vaunted and criticized
based on contrasting criteria of an unusually broad range of technical communities.
As a result, it is a rich historical case for exploring attributions of progress, success and
failure.
How do the backgrounds of different communities, and changing scientific,
economic and political environments, influence the reception of a new technology?
This paper examines how notions of success and failure became linked with expansion
and progress. Holography illuminates the peculiar post-World War II environment
that melded the military, commercial and popular engagement with scientific
and technological subjects, and the competing criteria by which they assessed their
products.
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Origins and Forecasts
During the first two decades of holography (1947–66) concepts coalesced but forecasts
shifted dramatically. The nascent subject was shaped in three intellectual environ-
ments, and became linked to existing concepts, inventions and metaphors, each of
which shaped perceptions of its prospects and defined its criteria of success.
Holography began as a technology founded on a novel scientific insight. Dennis
Gabor (1900–79), who conceived what he called ‘wavefront reconstruction’ while
working as an engineer at British Thomson-Houston in Rugby, England in 1947,
described it as an invention for improving electron microscopy. He envisaged his two-
step imaging technique as a method of avoiding the inherent aberrations of electron
microscope lenses.
The key idea relied on optical interference using monochromatic light. A wavefront
of light falling on an object is perturbed by it—diffracted around opaque edges, delayed
in being transmitted through transparent portions, or otherwise modified upon reflec-
tion. If the light source is coherent (that is, of a well-defined wavelength and having
stable phase), it will form a pattern of fine fringes if the perturbed and unperturbed
portions of the optical wavefront are brought together: the resulting dark and bright
regions map destructive and constructive interference between the two portions.
Gabor’s insight was that this optical interference pattern, which he dubbed a ‘holo-
gram,’ could be used subsequently to reconstruct a faithful three-dimensional image of
the original object when illuminated by coherent light.
According to Gabor’s implementation, the electron beam of an electron microscope
could be used to produce such a hologram of a microscopic sample. Being coherent
owing to its well-defined energy and origin from a small aperture, the electron beam
would be diffracted by the microscopic sample to form a ‘physical shadow,’ or interfer-
ence pattern, on photographic film. Once developed, the hologram would be placed in
an ‘optical synthetiser’ (sic) to use its diffraction pattern to reconstruct an enlarged and
complete image, which could be corrected optically to overcome the limitations of the
electron lenses used to record it.
Based partly on the positive response to the concept from scientists such as Sir
Lawrence Bragg, Max Born and Sir Charles Darwin (grandson of the evolutionist, and
Director of the National Physical Laboratory in Britain), Gabor joined Imperial
College, London as a senior academic in 1949, continuing development of what he
called ‘my favourite baby’ via an industrial research grant with colleagues at Associated
Electrical Industries (AEI).4 Nevertheless, Gabor, who by then had over twenty years’
experience as an inventor in areas as diverse as gas discharge lamps, stereoscopic
cinema and speech compression, conceived wavefront reconstruction in narrow terms.
He sought a patent framed in terms of apparatus for microscopy, predicting that the
tool could be developed to reveal individual molecules.5 A handful of other investiga-
tors pursued Gabor’s ideas, usually starting from the standpoint of microscopic imag-
ing using X-rays, electron beams or radio waves.6
Given Gabor’s identification of the technique with microscopy, and improved optical
resolution as a criterion of success, his technique had a restricted life. By the late 1950s
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he and his collaborators had abandoned their research owing to a variety of difficulties.
The AEI workers, attempting to alter their commercial microscope to record interfer-
ence fringes, blamed technical limitations. They found that their electron source was
not adequately coherent,7 and vibration, sample heating and instability of the electron
beam further aggravated their problems, but Gabor also attributed social factors to the
affair, blaming wavering commitment from his industrial colleagues and conservatism
of microscope manufacturers. Ascribing their ‘failure’ to inadequate motivation, and
concerned that publicity would sour researchers to the subject, he complained to the
Research Director at AEI, T. E. Allibone, that he did ‘not like being the bright boy who
produces brilliant dud ideas’.8
Nevertheless, Gabor and his student W. P. Goss experienced their own technical
difficulties in developing the optical synthetizer stage of the apparatus. The principal
problem was a ‘conjugate,’ or undesired twin, image reconstructed from the hologram.
This fuzzy and inextricable second image overlapped the desired reconstruction,
rendering the technique unsatisfactory for practical use. Gabor struggled to devise
optical methods of subtracting the twin image to improve image quality, but found that
his carefully fabricated optical schemes demanded extremely high mechanical toler-
ances and precise optical alignments to yield even mediocre results. Other workers
seeking a theoretical solution to the twin-image problem also found themselves facing
dead ends. By 1956, the most enthusiastic of them, Gordon Rogers, wrote privately, ‘As
far I am concerned, I am quite happy to let Diffraction Microscopy die a natural death.
I see relatively little future for it, and am looking forward to doing something else.’9
And two years later, Allibone publicly narrated the work in historical terms, dismissing
it as an unproductive detour for his company that had, at least, led to further work in
correcting the shortcomings of conventional electron microscopes.10
From the perspective of practicing microscopists, Gabor’s technique was judged to
be unpromising and arcane, a conclusion exacerbated by his limited practical achieve-
ments in attaining his own research targets. Moreover, by merging electron microscopy
with visible optics, wavefront reconstruction had aspects that appeared retrograde
rather than progressive. For instance, instead of the immediacy of seeing an image on
a fluorescent screen (as some electron microscopes then produced), the reconstructed
image was to be obtained more painstakingly via a 30-minute exposure, conventional
photographic processing, unintuitive optical transformation, and observation through
a conventional microscope eyepiece.11
In their various ways, these evaluations were shaped by their investigators’
backgrounds and working contexts, and judged Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction
distinctively during its shaky 10-year run. The ‘failed’ subject nevertheless was rehabil-
itated posthumously; indeed, Gabor was to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics for
holography in 1971. Unlike early accounts that stressed unsustainable progress, later
stories could tell a tale of triumph over adversity; of tenacious and even heroic workers
toiling in obscurity; of a chain of insights leading to a general principle and patent
claims; and of the inevitable success and progress of science.
This overturned judgment followed American research pursued quite independently
of Gabor and his contemporaries. A research engineer at an American classified lab,
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Emmett Leith (b. 1927) of the Willow Run Laboratories (WRL) of the University of
Michigan, had begun work in 1954 on the processing of signals from a new form of
radar, known as synthetic aperture radar (SAR). He and colleagues at Willow Run had
devised a means of using coherent light to transform the radar signals, recorded in the
form of gray tracks on a long strip of film, into a high-resolution optical image.
By 1956, Leith had conceived a relationship between this process and the theory of
physical optics. In 1960, Leith and his colleague in the Radar & Optics Lab, Juris
Upatnieks (b. 1936), began to extend Gabor’s work from their distinct cognitive
standpoint of optical information processing, a fertile hybrid of communication
theory (familiar to the electrical engineers that dominated WRL) and physical optics
(familiar to physicists). They developed a technique that sidestepped the technical
disadvantages of the twin image problem.12 Impressive results followed from this
research: first, the ability to produce clean reconstructed images of line drawings in
early 1961;13 second, high-quality grayscale images at the end of 1962; and finally,
with the use of the newly-available laser as a coherent light source in late 1963, an
astonishing form of three-dimensional imagery in which the reconstructed images
exhibited depth and parallax with unprecedented realism. In May 1964, Leith’s and
Upatnieks’ three-dimensional hologram was announced and demonstrated at the
Spring Optical Society of America meeting, and over the following months confer-
ence papers, newspaper reports and press releases portrayed it as ‘lensless three-
dimensional photography.’14
The accounts nevertheless strained to represent the perceived link with the photo-
graph. The Leith–Upatnieks hologram was a kind of transparency, but the image was
observed by looking through the hologram as through a window. Its featureless surface
was described as storing the image for later reconstitution. The copy of a hologram
yielded not a negative image, but another positive. And unlike a photograph, the holo-
gram could recreate a view of the entire image from any part; the pieces of a broken
hologram still worked. The technique was also restrictive: only small laboratory scenes
could be recorded. The transmission hologram was tied to the laser as a light source,
not just for its initial recording but also for subsequent reconstruction. The unfamiliar
attributes of this ‘window with a memory’ were difficult to reconcile with concepts of
photography but, despite the imperfect correspondence, photography was to be a
convenient guide to understanding the new medium and in forecasting its future devel-
opment.15
In parallel with these American developments but equally hidden in its early stages
was work pursued by Yury Denisyuk (b. 1927) in Leningrad. Denisyuk, an optical
researcher at the Vavilov State Optical Institute since 1954 and beginning an advanced
degree there four years later, was investigating means of recording the wavefront of light
reflected from an object. He extended ideas that had been pursued at the turn of the
century by Gabriel Lippmann, who had conceived a technique for recording the inter-
ference of light through the depth of a fine photographic emulsion. When Lippmann’s
special recordings were subsequently illuminated, they could reconstruct the full color
of a scene by constructively reinforcing the component wavelengths that had recorded
the regular layers. Denisyuk considered an extension of the same process using coherent
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light, and deduced that such interference layers captured not only the wavelengths used,
but also the geometry of the wavefront of light itself. His ‘wave photographs’ could
reconstruct the image of a three-dimensional surface, but without the necessity of a
focusing lens. Using a mercury arc light source, as had Gabor, Leith and Upatnieks,
Denisyuk created three-dimensional images of curved mirrors and simple reflective
objects.16 The technique, subsequently known as ‘Denisyuk,’ ‘Lippmann’ or simply
‘reflection’ holography, was different in concept and implementation from those of
Gabor and Leith and Upatnieks. It reconstructed three-dimensional images by reflec-
tion from the hologram in normal (‘white’) light, and had no link with either micros-
copy or image processing. Instead, its more demanding recording conditions and
viewing arrangements made it rather analogous to a 19th century daguerreotype, but
with the addition of depth and (potentially) color.17 While Denisyuk initially struggled
to conceive applications of his concept, he portrayed his technique as a superior form
of photography for a limited class of objects, or as a color-dependent optical element.
Because of this unimaginative portrayal and lack of an influential mentor, his Soviet
contemporaries largely ignored Denisyuk’s research.
Thus the work of Gabor, Leith–Upatnieks and Denisyuk created at least three
versions of an intellectual concept and its associated technologies: either an instrument
for improved microscopy; a type of three-dimensional, lensless photograph in the form
of a transmissive window; or, a method of recording the complete optical properties of
a shallow object on a reflective plate. These divergent conceptions, arising from differ-
ent technical and occupational contexts, profoundly shaped the early forecasts of the
subject known by 1966 as holography. Moreover, their respective ‘successes’ were
differently evaluated. Gabor’s narrow portrayal of wavefront reconstruction during the
1950s had yielded few forecasts beyond improved microscopy. His concept was self-
limiting and of interest principally to workers interested in ultra-microscopy and the
then limited field of physical optics. Denisyuk’s self-assessment was similarly derided
or ignored. By contrast, the Leith–Upatnieks conception excited great interest far
beyond the domain of physicists and engineers. The intellectual locus for these initial
forecasts was photography, and the geographical locus was the town of Ann Arbor,
where the University of Michigan and the Willow Run Laboratories were based.
The Conductron Corporation and Commercial Predictions of Holography
For most American observers, the Leith–Upatnieks technique was framed in terms of
a potential success story. Popular accounts portrayed the viewing of a hologram as a
sublime experience filled with childlike wonder, as an outgrowth of photography, as
an expression of modern science, and as an illustration of industrial and scientific
collaboration.
Awe was an emotion commonly voiced by viewers of holograms. The notion of a
‘technological sublime,’ explored by historian of technology David Nye, is relevant to
the experience.18 While Nye focuses on the effects of large-scale technology in evoking
a sense of the sublime (immense dams, complex railways and the atomic bomb, for
example) I would argue that holograms and their viewing environments had a
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profound impact akin to glimpsing a rare natural phenomenon. Consider the rainbow
appearing after a severe storm, and dividing the sky into bright and dark regions by
its colourful arc; ice haloes appearing in the shrouding fog of a cold morning; bright
lightning bolts in an otherwise inky sky; the heiligenschein, a halo of light surrounding
the shadow of one’s head reflected from a field of dewy grass; or the glory, a circular
rainbow around the shadow of an airplane as it flies above a cloud. Each of these optical
phenomena is experienced in a peculiar context that isolates the observer from the
everyday world.19
The same transcendent experience could be experienced in demonstrations of
holograms. Like natural phenomena, the experience of viewing a hologram awed early
observers because of the profoundly unfamiliar imagery and disorienting environ-
ment. The holographic images of the 1960s were isolated from the viewer, appearing
behind the hologram surface, and were illuminated by the unnatural speckled light of
the laser. Rooms were dark, and sometimes shrouded in curtains; the hologram was
illuminated by a hidden source, appearing bright and disembodied from its environ-
ment, and most importantly, the image was three-dimensional, realistic and yet
untouchable. Even when, like the first generation of holograms made by scientists, the
images were mundane—tools, trains or chessmen—the context gave them an aura of
ghost-like unfamiliarity.
The viewing experience suggested hidden potential to early observers. Holography
as a subject seemed replete with latent possibilities for new imaging applications, and
there were veiled uses, too: the Willow Run Laboratories, having the largest early
concentration of holographers, continued to focus on classified applications of optical
data processing for its sponsors in the Department of Defense. One consequence of the
parallel public and hidden lines of research was that Leith’s and Upatnieks’ contribu-
tions were initially eclipsed by a new colleague in the more academically open Electrical
Engineering Department of the University of Michigan.20
Nevertheless, early commercial expansion of the technology went hand-in-hand with
military sponsorship. The most significant early explorations of holography’s commer-
cial potential were made at the Conductron Corporation in Ann Arbor. The company
had been founded in 1960 by Keeve M. (Kip) Siegel, an engineer-entrepreneur who had
joined the Willow Run Labs in 1948 and heading its Upper Atmospheric Physics Group
between 1949 and 1953.21 Siegel, a larger-than-life figure who directed the laboratory
authoritatively but charismatically, populated his new Conductron Corporation with
employees drawn from WRL and supported initially, like Willow Run itself, by military
contracts.22
The Conductron Corporation took up holography by the same route that Leith had
been drawn to it—via synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and using surplus resources
from lucrative development contracts. One of their first contracts, directed by physicist
Gary Cochran, was to produce optical processing equipment for SAR data processing.
By late 1964, he had made his first hologram, and later recalled: 
Kip Siegel had a chance to see it, and he was fascinated. Kip Siegel was a promoter. He was
the kind of guy [who felt that] it didn’t matter whether you made any money if he could
get the excitement of Wall Street bankers and get more investment capital. He saw the
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potential …. Siegel was clearly interested in developing the technology as a tool of invest-
ment.23
As Cochran began to study the field, making bigger and better holograms, Siegel
became seduced by the technology. From 1965, he dedicated Conductron’s optical
team to pursuing impressive and sublime applications of holography.
Siegel proselytized a merging of military and commercial domains. Underlying it
was strong faith correlating the advancement of knowledge with inevitable technolog-
ical impact. Conductron’s growing variety of display pieces was intended to illustrate
inexorable progress: in effect, the company attempted to suggest determinism by
boot-strapping commercial interest, attracting investment financing to further develop
technical improvements. By early 1967, Cochran’s 40-strong optics group was respon-
sible both for SAR contracts for the military and for hologram production and devel-
opment aimed at would-be corporate sponsors.
They worked initially to advance the technical possibilities of display holograms,
moving from 4×5 inch to 8×10 inch and then 11×14 inch ‘window’ holograms during
1966. Holograms, lit by filtered mercury lamps, were increasingly produced for trade
show displays. More dramatic but less practical holograms were shown only to visitors
in the Conductron lobby or lab. For instance, when a helium-neon (red) and argon
(blue and green) lasers were combined to make separate holographic exposures on the
same hologram plate, they could create a color image. While such holograms attracted
interest and exemplified the technical progress being made in image reproduction,
their display requirements (two carefully aligned and power-hungry lasers) made them
too unwieldy to be sold or even displayed outside the lab. The notion of progress was
thus problematic from the outset: displays became more impressive, but the necessary
equipment multiplied in cost, complexity and unreliability.
Progress was also touted in terms of production range and capacity. Between 1965
and 1970, the firm created over a thousand custom holograms for clients ranging from
Hoffman La Roche (pharmaceutical displays for trade shows) to General Motors
(lobby, museum and trade show displays) to artists (Richard Wilt and Bruce Nauman).
Conductron’s most important customer proved to be the publishers of the World Book
Encyclopedia, who contracted the company to produce holograms to be included in the
forthcoming 1967 Science Year. The project required the copying a ‘master’ hologram
of chess pieces to make some 500,000 copies on film. The resulting copies, bound into
the books, could be illuminated by a flashlight directed through a supplied red plastic
filter.24 This unprecedented achievement nevertheless provided ambivalent commer-
cial success: production costs were covered, and the publication proved the best-selling
edition of the Science Year, but no orders of comparable size followed.25
Beyond such status-raising achievements, Siegel directed Conductron’s staff to
develop dramatic demonstration pieces to support his predictions for holography.
What had been identified as an autonomous technology became ever more intentional
and stage-managed. A consummate showman, Siegel’s unrestrained forecasts had a
strong effect on public expectations. A typical example of Siegel’s rhetoric was the claim
that, by 1975, ‘the United States will have, as far as new products are concerned, only
three-dimensional television and three-dimensional movies on the market. I would not
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expect two-dimensional processing, two-dimensional television, two-dimensional
home movies to continue—that’s my personal belief. I don’t think people will buy
things that are antiquated.’26
One of Siegel’s most public predictions was the inevitable development of hologra-
phy as a medium for recording large-scale events, epitomized by his goal of making a
holographic movie of the Olympic games. When his new McDonnell Douglas partners
remained skeptical of the feasibility of holographic movies, Siegel’s engineers devised a
holographic animation to demonstrate the feasibility of such applications. Using a loop
of 70-mm wide film, they recorded several dozen individual hologram frames of a
model merry-go-around, repositioned manually for each individual holographic
exposure. For reconstruction, the engineers adapted a commercial projector to illumi-
nate the frames successively in a continuous loop. The result was an animated (and
cyclic) 3D movie. The reconstructed scene was viewed through magnifying optics to
give a realistic perception of a three-dimensional changing scene.
Despite their severe technical constraints, the short animations were portrayed as a
commercially important step towards holographic movies and television. This
approach of producing a proof-of-concept model was an extension of methods pursued
in military research contracts. Siegel’s company sought to continue this feedback cycle
(attracting more investment capital for ever-more impressive demonstrations) to the
point of yielding viable commercial products. Such activities also encouraged optimis-
tic research for solutions to unlikely goals, in a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example,
while the rather limited demonstration device illustrated the principle, Conductron
engineers realized that producing practical holographic movies would require a high-
powered pulsed laser to record moving objects—such as people—before they could
move enough to smear the interference fringes on the photosensitive plate, and that
such a laser for recording outdoor scenes would certainly have dangerous and probably
unattainable power requirements.27 Nevertheless, during 1966 and 1967, they devel-
oped a pulsed ruby laser that produced a sufficiently intense beam to record first a
human hand, and soon a human portrait in a darkened room.28 When further technical
improvement proved impossible, the Conductron marketing staff sought to redefine
the goals. They turned from holographic movies to three-dimensional human scenes,
recording holograms of commercial displays, groups of poker players and (perhaps
apocryphally) nude dancers.29
Siegel’s impossibly optimistic predictions and speculative funding sustained the
momentum at Conductron until 1967, when he resigned to form a new start-up firm,
KMS Industries. The design of dramatic demonstrations and the pursuit of paying
customers for holograms continued at both Conductron and KMS Industries for a
further three years. When McDonnell Douglas moved the Conductron operation to
Missouri in 1970, it even more intensively marketed the commercial possibilities of
pulsed holography for advertising purposes.30 At his new company on the other side of
Ann Arbor, Siegel created a new holography team to pursue viable applications and
further enticements for investors.
The ‘success’ of the Conductron development was thus ambivalent. The pulsed-laser
activities were company- and investor-funded and commercially unproductive, but
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illustrated clear technical progress in a limited domain over a short period. Through
such developments, the company became the messenger of a particular view of
progress. For Conductron, the hologram was an effective icon, embodying all that was
new and valued in that well-funded decade, and melding the laser, high science and
awe-inspiring imagery into an example of seemingly inevitable technical advance.31
This divergence between marketplace reality and commercial claims is not unique, of
course: it was a feature in other new technological fields such as nuclear power during
the 1950s, biotechnology from the 1980s and nanotechnology from the 1990s.32 Even
the vocabulary associated with such developments can unconsciously suggest that
improvement is somehow inherent, via phrases such as ‘emerging technology’ or
‘promises outpacing achievements’.
In a more restrained fashion, other firms, too, cited practical indicators of progress
for the new science. From the late 1960s, for instance, ‘holographic interferometry’ or
‘holographic non-destructive testing’ (HNDT), a sensitive technique for measuring
mechanical motion or deformation, became popular with metrologists and mechanical
engineers and found a market niche. A commercial holographic tire-tester developed
by the Ann Arbor company GC-Optronics, for example, allowed the lamination of
airplane tires to be verified rapidly. For this application, the criteria of success were
economic (lower costs) technical (better testing reliability) and social (improved
customer safety).
Nevertheless, these criteria were not often attained. By 1970, Clark Charnetski, a
physicist at Conductron, could summarize what the company had already learned in
its own attempts to promote holography. He noted that the spectacular predictions
made by Siegel and others had provided large investment capital but few commercially
viable applications. To the surprise of Conductron engineers, display holography had
been less important economically than had other uses such as holographic non-
destructive testing. Charnetski ascribed this to the cost and difficulty of producing
holograms of large scenes and in developing copying processes. But the problem also
had non-technical dimensions: 
Holography was and still is largely done by scientists and engineers, and these people are
as a whole more interested in the scientific things and therefore lend their talents more
readily to scientific applications than toward breaking into the advertising game.33
The often-vain exploration for potential markets led a number of large firms to with-
draw quietly from the field by the early 1970s. For instance, CBS Laboratories
employed Dennis Gabor as a consultant but developed no promising products. RCA
developed a prototype consumer video playback system (Selectavision Holotape) in
1969, but canceled the project in 1972 when the firm was in financial difficulties and
facing competition from more versatile magnetic recording technologies. McDonnell
Douglas closed its pulsed holography operation in 1973 owing to inadequate interest
from the advertising industry and corporate customers. IBM’s early enthusiasm
for holographic computer memories did not culminate in products, and Polaroid
Corporation, while developing recording techniques and new photosensitive media
during the 1970s, did not effectively market them.
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The enthusiasms of technologists did not necessarily translate to those of wider
culture. Marketing holograms proved unexpectedly difficult, and there was increasing
disjunction between technical forecasts and economic reality.
Sponsorship and Community Values
The Conductron experience illustrates how one community—a nascent commercial
group operating according to practices absorbed from military-contract research—
defined holography and its accomplishments during the 1960s. Its engineers were
habituated to exploring applications creatively in a classified context and with rela-
tively abundant funding, and were imbued with confidence in the very notion of
progress. They arguably were less sensitive to commercial pressures than were typical
workers in industry, however, because they envisaged holography as a dramatic and
inevitable extension of photography. Conductron consequently sought display appli-
cations that highlighted its three-dimensionality and visual impact. Less convincingly,
its engineers forecast and pursued the extension of holography to color imagery,
movies and television based on the technical trajectory of those earlier imaging media,
and most misleadingly, again using the analogy of early photography, they predicted a
rising public appeal and inevitably growing market just like its antecedents.34
Ann Arbor, while generating the first cohort of holographic researchers, had an atyp-
ical context of research and funding. Other academic scientists and commercial engi-
neers, less dependent on military sponsorship, operated in different intellectual,
funding and social environments. Moreover, by 1970 a wider range of adopters was
becoming involved in the subject, particularly artisans and artists inspired by the coun-
terculture and technological art, respectively.35 Each of these embryonic communities
developed a unique perspective on the nature of the subject, its goals and criteria of
success.
As discussed above, for military sponsors and the scientific holographers who
pursued research for them, the demonstration of theoretical extensions and technolog-
ical potential were paramount. Military supremacy required a competitive edge, and
sponsors favored bold replacements of existing technologies. The result created an
expectation of continual extension of knowledge and technical capabilities, and a
continuance of the relative freedom from economic concerns that had dominated mili-
tary research since World War II. There was a consequent faith in both positivism
(particularly in its view of knowledge as incrementally and inexorably growing) and
technological progressivism (inevitable improvement in performance measured
according to self-evident technical criteria), with both assuming social improvement as
a foreseeable by-product.
For artists, on the other hand, success in holography was evaluated according to
different criteria. The medium had to have adequate technical versatility to support
aesthetic expression, and the new art form required the acceptance of art critics and a
receptive public. While this was relatively free of positivist underpinnings, these criteria
did embody implicitly progressive ideas, namely the assumption that the capabilities
and audience for the medium would expand.
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Different criteria applied to artisans who took up holography during the early 1970s.
Their definition of progress was a combination of growing audiences and income from
the sale of holograms, alongside the development of new techniques of production,
especially cost-effective or simplified methods. But, as with other communities of
holographers, success was defined in terms of expansion, which amounted to anticipa-
tion of continual progressive increase. These practitioners supported their work by
operating schools of holography in non-academic and non-scientific contexts, through
custom work for clients, and by the sale of holograms to the public.
It is noteworthy that the community of artisans, like aesthetic or fine-art hologra-
phers, often supported this implicit assumption of technical progress and consequent
mass popularity even while embracing countercultural themes. Thus for all three
communities—scientists, artists and artisans—stagnant conditions, measured in terms
of income generation, technical abilities, and acceptance by critics, consumers,
students or the wider public, equated to failure for the subject.36
During the 1980s, despite its exposure to hundreds of thousands of viewers through
public exhibitions of holograms, and the growing ubiquity of mass-produced holo-
grams, the subject could not be characterized reliably by these criteria, and appeared
different to each constituency. The indefinable state of progress can be illustrated by
bibliometric indicators: by the mid 1990s, while the annual publication rates of papers
and patents were rising, those of books and theses were falling, and the number of
scientific conferences and hologram art exhibitions had diminished to half their value
of a decade earlier.37 For artists and artisans, the field was declining; for scientists, it had
periodic ups and downs; but for inventors and investors, it continued to look promis-
ing. Economic, rather than population, indicators consequently became a widely
accepted mark of success of the medium. For different communities then, holography
was a subject that either evinced obvious success, remained latent with potential, or had
outlived its promise.
Segregating Communities: Judgments of Successful Imagery
The contrasting judgment of separate constituencies is further illustrated by the goals
of holographic imaging. The emerging occupational specialists of holography variously
identified the strengths and weaknesses of holographic technology. They argued that a
collection of limitations surrounding the hologram prevented the expansion of the
technology of holography in wider culture. This was a two-way process: their mutually
incompatible criteria encouraged the holographic communities to differentiate
further. The divergence of holograms and their associated communities is consistent
with the framework of social construction of technology (SCOT) and its concepts of
relevant social groups and interpretative flexibility.38 However, for most of these
groups consensus and closure were not attained. Instead, their technical goals diverged
while they continued to seek improvement for their medium, making stability elusive.
The gaze of these distinct communities identified dissimilar limitations for
the medium. The first to be noted were problems with the laser itself.39 Holograms
illuminated by lasers revealed the phenomenon of laser speckle. The reconstructed
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image and, indeed, any surface illuminated by the laser, appears to shimmer and spar-
kle with a graininess that depends critically on the position of the observer’s eyes. The
effect, resulting from the random constructive and destructive interference from the
highly coherent laser light (having a narrow distribution of wavelengths and light
waves that were ‘in step,’ producing interference over centimeters or even meters), was
exacerbated by diffusely reflecting surfaces. This technical artifact could mask the
otherwise stunning imagery of the hologram, but was a complaint of scientists and
engineers more than aesthetic holographers: laser speckle was a particular problem
when photographing holograms, an activity common in scientific and engineering stud-
ies, but relatively unimportant for casual viewers.40
On the other hand, the cost of the laser was a crucial constraint for artists and adver-
tisers but of relatively little importance to well-funded scientists. Continuous Wave
(CW) lasers remained prohibitively expensive for galleries to purchase in moderate
numbers, and pulsed lasers were out of reach of most laboratories. Lasers were also
unfamiliar and intimidating for non-scientists, and their use was curtailed severely
with the introduction of safety legislation in the early 1970s concerning eye exposure
to laser beams, but lasers were also relatively dim light sources for reconstructing the
holographic image. Seldom exceeding tens of milliwatts of optical power, the laser was
adequate to illuminate a single hologram well in a normally lit room, but not in a
daylight-illuminated shop window. If any other form of light were used to reconstruct
a hologram, the image would be unacceptably blurred. Neither of these restrictions was
a particular problem for scientific applications such as holographic interferometry, but
judged to be a severe limitation for public displays.
A third characteristic constrained holography as a medium for portraits. The very
monochromaticity of laser light provided eerily unworldly images akin to the street
illumination from sodium lamps, or the orthochromatic (blue- or green-sensitive)
images of early photographic and cinematographic films. The contrast and tonal grada-
tions of reconstructed images appeared unfamiliar, and was inferior to the panchro-
matic black-and-white films that had been used universally since World War II.
This effect was exacerbated in the first portraits made with pulsed ruby lasers. Because
human skin is slightly transparent to the wavelength of a ruby laser, portraits made
subjects look waxy-skinned, blotchy and disturbingly morbid. Unlike photography, its
perceived analog, holography failed to develop a market for portraiture, and artists who
adopted pulsed lasers more successfully employed them for figure studies rather than
facial depictions. For photographers, holographic portraiture and color holography
represented problems, not progress.
A further constraint was that holographic images were static, and thus of limited
interest for media applications. Indeed, the imagery of living things represented an
instant of time, frozen in space. Holograms produced with pulsed lasers, acting like a
fast flash camera, captured unsettlingly frozen facial expressions of their subjects who
had been sitting in near darkness, often accentuating the unfamiliarity by showing the
unusually wide irises of the dark-adapted eye.41
In sum, these limitations restricted holography to a narrow class of subjects and to a
seemingly unnatural or stylized representation, paradoxically in opposition to its
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highly realistic perspective. The ‘problems’ and putative ‘solutions’ were differently
ranked for different communities, however.
The most pressing problem for aesthetic and commercial users (but irrelevant for
scientists) was the need for a laser to display the hologram. Denisyuk’s holograms of
the early 1960s offered a solution: they produced a clear green image when viewed in
sunlight or room lighting. But creating such holograms demanded extremely high-
resolution photographic emulsions and very stable conditions during the exposure.
They became popular in the Soviet Union from the mid 1970s as a means of recording
historic objects, but had a low uptake in the West because the emulsions and chemistry
were not readily available, and because artists perceived them to offer limited options
for creativity.
Another technical approach was the ‘image plane’ hologram, in which a hologram
of a hologram (a ‘second generation’ hologram) was recorded.42 Such a hologram
produced little color smearing of reconstructed images for points near the plate, so a
white light source was adequate to view holograms of shallow objects. A secondary
advantage was that such images were even more striking than conventional holograms:
the image appeared to pass through the hologram plate. This appealing attribute
became ubiquitous in commercial and art holograms by the late 1970s, but was of little
interest to scientists.
During the early 1970s, the ‘rainbow hologram’ also became widespread. The tech-
nique, later dubbed ‘white light transmission holography’, was reported tangentially by
Polaroid scientist Stephen Benton (1941–2003) in 1969 while his employers sought a
patent, but became more widely known only from 1973 after his collaboration with artist
Harriet Casdin-Silver (b. 1925).43 By employing a special optical geometry to record the
hologram, a sharp image could be viewed in white light, although cast in a spectrum of
colors that shifted with the viewing position. Benton became a well-known intermediary
between scientific and artistic communities, particularly after his move to the new MIT
Media Lab in 1984. The Media Lab, uniting a collection of enthusiastic engineers and
scientists, sought to transform culture via new media technologies, aiming, as one
breathless account put it, to invent the future.44 Benton’s Spatial Imaging Group was
funded by sponsors courted by Conductron 20 years earlier: General Motors and the
American military, via the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
Rainbow holograms importantly reduced the cost of displaying holograms, but had
an uneven popularity that further divided supporters. East-coast American hologra-
phers, close to Benton’s Massachusetts laboratory, adopted rainbow holograms more
enthusiastically than did their west coast and European counterparts. Artists champi-
oned the technique, discovering that, by overlaying several exposures, a single holo-
gram could display multi-colored images. However, rainbow holography was rejected
by Soviet practitioners, who saw the technique as complex and much poorer in quality
than their own reflection holograms, and by most American scientists, who were
concerned with the accurate recording and dimensional analysis of three-dimensional
objects or transitory events.45
By allowing white-light reconstruction of the holographic images, these techniques
removed the need for an expensive laser for viewing, and also removed the objectionable
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speckle that went with it. They were also bright (especially for rainbows), although
usually limited in depth. Bleaching the photographic emulsion allowed holographic
images to be even brighter, aiding the art community and the most promising market
niche of the 1970s, advertising.
From the 1980s, ‘embossed holograms’ provided new opportunities for technical
judgments and forecasts. Embossed holograms combined image-plane and rainbow
holography in a reflective form that could be reproduced using adapted printing-press
technology. Manufactured by the millions on metal foil, they became ubiquitous in
packaging, graphic arts and security applications.46 While this brought holograms to
a much wider audience, it generated dramatically divergent judgments. Unlike the
previous varieties of holograms, this new type generated not just indifference from
different communities, but outright animosity.
Embossed holograms were inexpensive, reducing the cost of copies by a hundred-
fold. They could be mass-produced reliably using a number of proprietary techniques
that seemed less constricted by patents than were earlier products. They were chemi-
cally and mechanically stable, unlike most previous hologram materials that were
susceptible to scratches, humidity or aging. Together, these technical advantages
promoted the widespread application of embossed holograms.
However, connoisseurs of imaging—the self-styled ‘display holographers’ made up
of artists and artisans—derided embossed holograms. The flexible backing of
embossed holograms, particularly those on magazine covers, caused color shifts and
image distortion, and because the holograms were usually viewed in uncontrolled
lighting, images could appear fuzzy or dim. In response to these limitations, their
producers progressively simplified the imagery to incorporate shallow, eye-catching
patterns, a product that some in the industry contemptuously dubbed ‘shiny shit.’47
By moving toward less ambitious images, embossed holograms evolved to minimize
their perceived weaknesses and to exploit new markets. While applications such as
magazine illustrations declined, others expanded, and created new industries and
adopters. Visual appeal was redefined. Their image characteristics made embossed
holograms particularly suitable for attention-grabbing product packaging (a profitable
and growing industry from the early 1990s) and for security applications, where any
defect in the complex pattern could indicate tampering or counterfeiting.48
This technical mutation, while capturing a large market and the first undeniably
profitable application of holography, arguably amounted to a reversal of the original
aims of the medium. Yet consensus about success could not be defined in utilitarian
terms. Embossed holograms promoted low-cost mass production but had relatively
poor image quality; they brought three-dimensional imagery to vastly increased
audiences, but simultaneously reduced the sublime characteristics of depth, parallax
and image clarity. Security applications exploited the complex color shifts and angle-
dependence of embossed holograms, making the forgery of credit cards and bank notes
more difficult, but for imaging purposes, these characteristics were deemed to be a
serious defect. Fine-art holograms became less popular, with artists complaining that
embossed holograms irreparably devalued the aesthetic attraction of the medium.49
This expansion of holography into the mass market was thus judged by its initial
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supporters to be a failure, because it had deviated from their forecast trajectory. The
‘shiny shit’ had defiled the utopian predictions.
The evolving techniques for producing bright, white-light holograms thus both
liberated the growing field of display holography in the 1970s for commercial use and
constrained its acceptance in the 1980s, particularly for artists. The tribulations of
display holographers were not faced by most scientific and engineering users, who
continued to employ laser-viewable holograms; nor were they recognized by marketers
of packaging and anti-counterfeiting holograms. Thus, the applications of holograms
supported the growing segregation of practitioners and conflicting definitions of
success.
Wider Judgments: Critics and Consumers
Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction, Conductron’s exploration of commercial markets,
and the ambivalent assessments of display holography illustrate the varied judgments
attached to the subject. For all communities of holographic practitioners, however,
expectations of progress remained strong. Indeed, some forecasts, oft rejuvenated,
seemed impervious to attributions of failure despite the continued lack of demonstrable
viability. Among these were predictions of holographic ‘optical memories’ for retriev-
ing data.50 One reason for the endurance of such promised applications was faith in
technological progressivism and determinism by its advocates, even when uncorrobo-
rated by evidence. It was expected that the new invention would not only provide new
and better things, but would necessarily change culture and wider society as a result.
Nevertheless, holography was repeatedly cited as having failed in expanding enthu-
siasm, garnering audiences and developing markets—a failure, in effect, to conform to
the expectations of technological progressivism. Artists responded with dismay, for
instance, to negative reviews of a large hologram exhibition, Holography ’75, held at the
International Center for Photography in New York, which curtailed their expectations
of aesthetic acceptance and growing markets.51 Both critics and artists (to their chagrin)
portrayed holography as immature and in a state of early aesthetic and technical
development; both, indeed, were imbued with a similar definition of progress.
In order to sustain continued confidence, predictions mutated. Forecasts during
holography’s first active decade—extending from 1965 to 1974—had been uniformly
expansionist, making unrealistically optimistic extrapolations based on laboratory
demonstrations or even speculative applications.52 Some commentators had attributed
deviations from commercial forecasts to the complexity of patent litigation, and the
resulting hesitancy of many firms to employ holograms as a result.53 When, after one
decade, two decades or a quarter century, material achievements were not obvious to
all, the original commentators and others—notably Stephen Benton, who became
prominent as conference organiser and holography pundit—recast the development of
their field as an historical narrative either still linked with latent progress54 or portrayed
simplistically as a classic tale of market failure.55
Yet none of these later depictions dominated public consciousness of holography.
Instead, understandings became shaped by fictional portrayals, causing a bifurcation
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between the technical realities and the imagined future of the medium. These positiv-
istic depictions of progress in fictional holography originated from the scientific and
commercial forecasts of the 1960s but dramatically extended and diverged from them.
For the general public, the notion of holograms as awesome but intangible images was
fostered by the film Star Wars (written 1973–7, released 1977), and on television by the
British comedy series Red Dwarf (pilot written in 1983, series broadcast 1988–94)
and the Star Trek television series The Next Generation (broadcast 1987–94) with its
‘holodeck,’ or holographic visualization room, by Deep Space Nine (1993–99) with
‘holosuites,’ or commercially-operated holographic environments, and by Voyager
(1995–2001) with its ‘Emergency Medical Hologram,’ or virtual doctor. These science
fictional portrayals transformed the hologram from a glass plate into a more dramatic
creation, ranging from mere optical playback of a recording (in Star Wars) to
computer-generated lifelike characters (in Red Dwarf) to entire interactive environ-
ments that include sensations of touch, sound and smell (in the later Star Trek series).56
Popular culture thus became diverted by a virtual image of the subject that could not
be realized by any community of holographers.57 Anticipation, supported by faith in
progress, threatened to outstrip reality.
This splitting of real and imagined futures, evident in the earlier commercial fore-
casts as well as later science fictional accounts, is a theme common to many new tech-
nologies. It has parallels with the account that Colin Milburn has given of
nanotechnology, for instance. Milburn argues that popular and professional writing
about nanotechnology amounts to a ‘teleological narrative’ that transforms a dream
into something that is inevitable.58 He suggests that promotion of the subject has
transgressed a line between ‘speculative science’ (an extrapolation of current scientific
thinking, describing what could be) and ‘fictional science’ (an account of what, inevi-
tably, will be, in some world to come). In a similar vein, Kip Siegel’s forecasts could be
characterized as fictional science that influenced science fiction writers a decade later.
Such incredible extrapolations may not require the disorienting qualities of the holo-
gram, though. The near-utopian predictions for holography, promoted by its fantastic
early commercial claims, have been made of other, more mundane, technologies.59
In any case, such fictional diversions increased expectations, and adversely affected
the cottage industries of holography that appeared during the 1980s. Small firms selling
holograms for home viewing, which had sprung up in major cities after major exhibi-
tions, failed to thrive. Small commercial galleries, such as the Holos Gallery in San
Francisco, gradually discovered that sales of holograms could sustain them only if their
businesses were transformed into wholesaling operations for distributing holographic
trinkets to museums of science and technology.60 Popular interest and markets proved
fickle, however, and few companies became profitable for long. The sale of holographic
art, always marginal, declined as holographic kitsch in the form of embossed foils for
children’s stickers and magazine covers began to flood the market from the mid 1980s.
As discussed above, it is significant that artisanal and artistic holographers identified
this trajectory as non-progressive and hence an indicator of failure. They commonly
characterized the altered focus of public interest as a descent similar to the history of
earlier three-dimensional media, transforming them from a sublime technological
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experience to mere children’s products having lower intrinsic value.61 Thus they
judged the type of audience to be more important than its size.
The limited public acceptance of commercial holograms meant that real-world
holographers continued to struggle for occupational status and acceptance of their
products. The subject, its communities and their aspirations of progress were closely
interlinked. The technical groups associated with holography proved unstable partly
because public engagement and employment were themselves uncertain. Holography
did not develop applications that generated a stable occupation supported by university-
taught courses.62 The growth of long-lived occupations and accredited teaching
programs, usually deemed crucial for the consolidation of a new profession and a new
discipline, could not be sustained by the applications of holography. Instead, the subject
spawned several marginal constituencies, along with distinct forecasts and criteria of
success. Even the best supported of these, the broad field of optical engineering and
scientific holography, found its military and corporate funding difficult to sustain after
the Cold War. Artists and artisans found their exhibitions and income reduced by the
expansion of embossed holograms and changing public expectations. Colleagues in
other fields consequently interpreted the relative social invisibility of holographers as a
failure of the subject.
During the late 1980s, when holography was at a peak of visibility, practicing display
holographers comprised an active community of about a thousand individuals ranging
from scientists, to artisans, artists and entrepreneurs. The New York Museum of
Holography kept files on some 280 individual holographers, and attracted some 50,000
visitors to view their products every year.63 Yet the Museum, founded in 1976 to serve
not just the disparate subcultures of holography but also the general public, discovered
that holographers’ sense of community was ephemeral and inward looking. As discov-
ered by the schools and cottage industry that appeared during the 1970s and early
1980s, the Museum found that the general public absorbed the ideas and enthusiasms
of holographers with difficulty. In response, these budding organizations mounted
education campaigns that sapped more traditional profit-making activities. These oft-
repeated initiatives appear to have had only a local and transient impact. While the
early 1970s had witnessed sustained growth in the constituencies of holography, signs
of decline in institutional support of display holography became noticeable during the
1990s.64
Conclusions: Evaluating Progress, Success and Failure
As the cognitive boundaries of a technical subject shift, so, too, do its applications and
users, and their criteria of success. Examples abound in holography of how ‘failures’
and ‘successes’ were interpreted inconsistently by shifting audiences. The various advo-
cates of holography had distinctive aspirations, employed contrasting criteria to evalu-
ate its goals, problems and solutions, and thereby buttressed their own differentiation.
Thus Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction was typecast as a technically constrained, and
even backward-looking, microscopy during the 1950s, unworthy of forecasts. During
the 1960s, the revitalized subject was widely understood in terms of photography, an
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analogy that directed predictions in ways that were difficult to sustain. Scientists, artists
and artisans portrayed their subject as potential-filled, and judged it by its expansion,
especially by the number of adopters. They had divergent definitions of good imagery,
however, and so judged progress in conflicting ways. Was the technique developing
toward metrological accuracy in a laboratory environment, colorful displays in shop
windows, aesthetically nuanced fine art, the recording of public events, or a ubiquitous
anti-forgery product? Given the multiple constituencies, no consensus was possible,
nor can any generally agreed attribution of progress be made. For the same reason, we
cannot judge straightforward technological failure here. There was, however, a failure
of technological forecasting, owing to over-confidence in short-term achievements
made in an over-inflated funding environment.
Judging progress, success and failure is further complicated by the altering
prominence of these marginal technical communities. Embossed holography could be
represented as an unalloyed success in the late 1990s not only because of its commercial
profitability, but also because there were then fewer holographic artists to criticize its
imaging characteristics than two decades earlier. Holography as a concept and tech-
nique was discordantly categorized by its users, successively rejected, resurrected and
relegated to vulnerable commercial niches.
The history of the assessments and forecasts of holography has implications for other
studies in the history of science and technology. As this case shows, historical evalua-
tions of progress can be critically sensitive to appraisals made by different communi-
ties, particularly for unstable technologies that are adopted by distinct social groups.
Each of them—such as scientists, the military, artists, businesspeople and the public—
may employ different criteria in judging the subject. While we may expect attributions
of progress to depend on established or enunciated criteria, the case of holography
shows that judgments may be based almost entirely on implicit assumptions and super-
ficial analyses.65
Expectations for the trajectory of holography were supported by faith in both
philosophical positivism and technological progressivism and fueled by the expansive
funding environment of 1960s America. The predictions of progress relied on little-
examined assumptions and short-term forecasting, and its monitoring flavored
subsequent judgments of success and failure, but reexamination of such assessments
is difficult for such insecure subjects: lack of market success or professionalization can
hinder the documentation of a field. Would-be fields like holography must be tracked
by the historian as they evolve, not from scanty archival records. There will be a
tendency to under-represent subjects that have not been judged progressive and
successful by its contemporary practitioners and critics.
Holography further illustrates how closure is not an inevitable outcome for debates
in scientific subjects that do not reach disciplinary status, or for technologies that do
not achieve commercial viability. It suggests caution surrounding uncritical assump-
tions about the evolution of technological subjects: the inconsistent assessments
of progress and success cannot be attributed merely to the youth of a subject or to
inchoate relevant social groups. The notion of the ‘maturity’ of a subject is problematic
and must be divorced from scholars’ own expectations of progress towards consensus.
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Not all technologies become black-boxed; some merely lose their supporters and are
forgotten.
Gabor, the originator of the hologram, wrote and lectured on science and society in
his later years. One of his books, Inventing the Future, argued that while technological
societies find themselves unable to predict the future, they can invent it for them-
selves.66 This aim, echoed by the engineers at Conductron and the MIT Media Lab,
was not reached, but in altered form, the claim can be applied to predictions about the
subject that Gabor initiated: the imagined future for holography has been recast
repeatedly by successive waves of holographers, and continues to be reinvented by its
subsequent practitioner communities and adopters. The complementary perspec-
tive—namely explaining the past course of the subject—is equally a matter of reinven-
tion that must be disentangled from implicit assumptions about progress and success.
In a subject riven by contrasting assessments and predictions, I have argued that the
only indisputable failures surrounding holography concerned the forecasts them-
selves.
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‘Holography for the Sophomore Laboratory;’ Dickson and Stong, ‘The Amateur Scientist;’
Walker, ‘Amateur Scientist: Easy Way;’ Walker, ‘Amateur Scientist: Rainbow;’ Walker,
‘Amateur Scientist: How to Stop.’
37[37] Johnston, ‘Reconstructing the History.’
38[38] Pinch and Bijker, ‘The Social Construction.’
39[39] Leith and Upatnieks, trying lasers for the first time in December 1962, found them a nuisance
because of the optical ‘noise’ from stray reflection and interference, and only after several
months did they abandon mercury lamps [Hecht, ‘Applications Pioneer Interview;’ Juris
Upatnieks, 12 January 2005].
40[40] Speckle is most noticeable from a fixed position and using a small camera aperture to photo-
graph an image having a large depth of field. For observers bobbing their heads to see the
parallax of the image, though, the speckle is smeared out.
41[41] For a survey, see Bjelkhagen, ‘Holographic Portraits.’
42[42] Rosen, ‘Hologram of the Aerial Image.’
43[43] Benton, ‘Hologram Reconstructions.’
44[44] Brand, The Media Lab.
45[45] Yu. N. Denisyuk, 3 May 2003. Rainbow holograms also are devoid of vertical parallax: when
moving up and down, the observer sees the same image in a different color rather than a
different perspective.
46[46] McGrew, ‘Mass Produced Holograms.’ See, for example, the National Geographic Magazine
covers of March 1984, November 1985 and December 1988. Key aspects of embossing
technology had been developed for RCA Selectavision Holotape in the early 1970s.
47[47] The economics of embossed holograms did not improve the professional situation of hologra-
phers: embossing processes were taken over by commercial printing companies using fairly
conventional equipment, and relied on holographers only for the production of the original
master hologram.
48[48] Credit card holograms were introduced by MasterCard in 1983. The hologram industry was
subsequently dominated by packaging and security applications, a domain represented by a
periodical (Holography News, published by Reconnaissance International from 1987), by
annual conferences (Holopack-Holoprint, from 1989) and a trade body (International
Hologram Manufacturers’ Organization, 1992) seeking to monitor and regulate an industry
growing most rapidly in the Far East.
49[49] Margaret Benyon, 21 January 2003, Santa Clara, CA.
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50[50] Prognostications of a positive future include Weitzman, ‘Optical Technologies;’ Johnson and
Briggs, ‘Holography as Applied;’ Lang and Eschler, ‘Gigabyte Capacities.’ For a sociological
study of this branch of holographic research, see Tchalakov, ‘Innovating in Bulgaria.’
51[51] Kramer, ‘Holography.’
52[52] See, for example, reviews by Gabor, ‘The Outlook;’ Gabor, ‘Holography, Past, Present and
Future;’ Hammond, ‘Holography: Beginnings of a New Art Form;’ Dolgoff, ‘Commercial
Holography;’ Denisyuk, ‘Holography and Its Prospects;’ de Marrais, ‘Holography in the
Future Tense;’ Jeong, ‘Future Holography.’
53[53] McCluskey, ‘What a Mess.’
54[54] Dennis Gabor’s 1971 Nobel Prize for holography provided a convenient perspective from
which to evaluate the subject’s past and future. So, too, did the mid-1970s (the end of the ‘first
decade’), the mid 1980s (the end of the ‘second decade’) and the 1990s, when the elder
statesmen of the subject began to retire. Examples of these waves of historiography include
Leith and Upatnieks, ‘Holography at the Crossroads;’ Gabor, ‘Holography, 1948–1971;’
Benton, ‘Holography: the Second Decade;’ Benton, ‘Ten Years of White-Light Holography;’
Wesly, ‘Silver Anniversaries;’ Denisyuk, ‘My Way in Holography;’ and Cross and Cross,
‘HoloStories.’
55[55] For example, Bringolf, ‘Holography: A Medium.’
56[56] See also Pizzanelli, ‘Evolution of the Mythical Hologram.’
57[57] On the reputed public ‘misunderstanding’ of holograms, and the consequential difficulty of
marketing them, see Alexander, ‘Seller Beware.’
58[58] Milburn, ‘Nanotechnology,’ quotation p. 263.
59[59] A range of cases are discussed in Corn, Imagining Tomorrow and Sturken et al., Technological
Visions.
60[60] Gary Zellerbach, 1980, Los Angeles; Gary Zellerbach, 2 August 2003.
61[61] See, for example, Speer, ‘Before Holography.’
62[62] A few accredited post-graduate programs appeared, notably at the Royal College of Art
(London), Media Lab at MIT (Cambridge, MA), Art Institute of Chicago and Ontario College
of Art (Toronto) during the mid 1980s and early 1990s.
63[63] MIT Museum, MoH archive series 3, boxes 26–31.
64[64] The New York Museum of Holography closed in 1992, and its holdings were auctioned and
transferred to the MIT Museum a year later; the Museum für Holographie und neue visuelle
Medien in Pulheim, Germany, founded in late 1979, closed in 1994, as did Le Musée de
l’Holographie in Paris, founded in 1980; The Holography Unit of the Royal College of Art, an
important source of postgraduate fine-art holographers, closed in 1994; the Canada Council
ceased funding for holography in 1995; and, the final Gordon Research Conference of scien-
tist-holographers, initiated in 1972, was held in 1997.
65[65] Another example is the case of the New National Telescope, which astronomers widely judged
a failure because it was never built (McCray, ‘What Makes a Failure?). McCray, by contrast,
suggests that the project could be deemed a success because of its liberating effect on telescope
design, on promotion of international cooperation, and on public promotion of astronomy.
Similarly, Elzen argues that the Svedberg ultracentrifuge was seen as a successful artefact by
his contemporaries despite its lack of influence on present-day designs (Elzen, ‘The Failure of
a Successful Artifact’).
66[66] Gabor, Inventing the Future.
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